Abus de faiblesse et autres manipulations: Four Criticisms of Marie-France Hirigoyen's Book

“Abus de faiblesse et autres manipulations”: a critique of MF Hirigoyen’s book

By the CICNS (June 2012)

Marie-France Hirigoyen, “Abus de faiblesse et autres manipulations”, éditions JC Lattès, 2012

Marie-France Hirigoyen, psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, victimologist and familiar face on television sets, has just published a work entitled “Abus de faiblesse et autres manipulations”, éditions JC Lattès. This book comprises three parts: a first, in which the author presents definitions of complex notions — consent, the gift, seduction, influence, manipulation, hold, etc. — as well as certain related legal texts; a second part, in which she analyses the profile of the victims, with a chapter dedicated to “the hold of the cults”; a third part, in which she details the psychology of manipulators and impostors (mythomaniacs, narcissistic perverts, paranoiacs, etc.).

We make four principal criticisms of this work concerning in particular, but not only, the treatment of the question of the “cults”.

A journalistic, popularising style, often ill-suited

The style of the argument is journalistic, that is to say easy to read, with an evident intention to simplify and an absence of proof in numerous statements made, notably about the “cults”. Certain subjects tolerate simplification badly, because that simplification participates in the ambient confusion and simplism. Marie-France Hirigoyen illustrates her arguments with real cases, but these examples, over one or two pages (often less), do not make it possible to transcribe the complexity of human interactions; on the other hand, they often make it possible to transcribe surreptitiously the author’s opinion or the dominant thinking.

It is remarkable that the first example given by the psychiatrist is situated in a “cult” context (p.29). The account begins thus: “Jeanne’s son is a member of a cult…” and ends with: “Jeanne has decided to file a complaint for abuse of weakness: ‘I have had enough of hearing people who do not know this situation tell me that my son is an adult and therefore free to do what he wants and to see whom he wants. I do not want to “recover” my son, I only want him to be free to see whom he wants’”. MF Hirigoyen adds no commentary, but they are subliminal. The “cult” is not described (the term “cult” is not justified), the son’s opinion is not given, and the emotional charge of a mother “deprived” of her son, and moreover in a cultic context, will necessarily be transferred to the reader. This type of artifice — giving an example in an apparently neutral way, when its presentation is completely oriented — is, let us say it, a form of manipulation of which one may wonder whether the author is conscious, a troubling question in a work dealing with manipulation.

An absence of interdisciplinary analysis

One of the principal gaps in this type of book is its lack of interdisciplinarity. It is not possible to arrive at an understanding of the notion of manipulation through a simple psychiatric or psychoanalytic approach. A thorough reflection, notably sociological and legal, would have been necessary.

If Marie-France Hirigoyen had seriously attempted to broaden her field of study (without contenting herself with authors such as Jean-Claude Maes on the question of the “cults”), she would probably have understood that the notion of mental manipulation, applied to the “cults”, is intimately linked to a State action conducted against particular groups (spiritual, educational and therapeutic minorities). She could notably have taken into account the analyses of the sociologist Arnaud Esquerre or of Professor Patrice Rolland on the ins and outs of the About-Picard law. Instead of that, the psychiatrist specifies: “When, in the 1970s, associations for the defence of victims of cults were created, they had, in order to defend ex-followers, to explain what the subjects’ vulnerability consisted of. They had to define what a cult was and describe the procedures of mental manipulation”. What does MF Hirigoyen, a psychiatrist, think of the competence of these associations to arrive at such descriptions? We shall not know. Further on, commenting on the About-Picard law, she specifies: “This bill provoked a lively emotion in the cultic groups, of course, but also in the recognised religious communities and among psychiatrists, because it appeared as an infringement of freedom of conscience and of association. This offence would have been difficult to establish, because it introduces arbitrariness”. MF Hirigoyen is a psychiatrist; what does she think of it personally? We shall not know that either. According to her, the way round was to replace the initial text of the law on mental manipulation with the text introducing the notion of psychological subjection in its final version. A reading of the analysis by Maître Pérollier would have allowed her to understand that the two texts are equivalent. The author adds: “It nonetheless remains that it is very difficult to prove psychic pressures and mental manipulations, because justice attaches itself only to the facts. It therefore relies on medical expert reports, proofs and testimonies. But the latter are necessarily subjective, each envisaging the notion of consent differently”. If such is the case, why not say clearly that the About-Picard law is unacceptable, because it manipulates notions that nobody masters, and discriminatory, since it explicitly targets cultic movements in its title? On p.187, MF Hirigoyen attempts a definition of psychological subjection: “The person yields because her psyche has been saturated by psychological pressures. Is that not the definition of psychological subjection?”. Advertising and marketing pressure, managing to make consumers yield in order to bring them to an unconscious act of purchase — is that a psychological subjection? Are advertisers dangerous gurus?

Unconscious adherence to codes of single-track thinking, notably on the question of the “cults”

On p.201, in the chapter entitled “The hold of the cults” (let us note that MF Hirigoyen does not trouble herself with the difference, factitious to be sure, between “the fight against dérives sectaires” and “the fight against the cults”), the psychiatrist specifies: “Paradoxically, the terms “cult” and “mental manipulation” still have no legal definition. There exists no objective element for saying in what way a cult is different from a traditional religion or from a spiritual movement or a movement of thought, and it is difficult to quantify the psychological harm it can occasion”. The chapter could advantageously have stopped there, before the observation of too much simplism and too many amalgams on the question of the “cults”. But this apparent stepping-back, suggesting that she had really reflected on the question, in fact allows MF Hirigoyen to make a presentation, over ten pages, of the means of recognising a “cult” that the MIVILUDES or the UNADFI would not disown (the author moreover specifies: “The Internet sites of the UNADFI and of the MIVILUDES can usefully enlighten the reader”). Example: “The cults play, moreover, with the limits in every domain. Where to draw the frontier of the cultic movements? Most act under cover of associations that operate at the limit of legality. Some hide behind a religious mask, since the State establishes no difference between a religion and a cult calling itself religious. Others, and they are more and more numerous, take refuge behind a medical, psychotherapeutic, ecological, cultural, ethical or even commercial façade”.

On p.209, MF Hirigoyen helps the reader to “spot” a dérive sectaire. “The group develops a radical and intolerant alternative ideology”: are the political parties developing radical and intolerant ideologies “cults”? “The structure of the group is authoritarian and autocratic behind a guru or a restricted elite, heir to his message. The followers are placed in a situation of dependence”: the army is a structure where the chain of command is extremely strict, with no discussion permitted, and in which a hierarchical superior can order someone to kill or to be put in a position to be killed. Does the army use psychological subjection with soldiers subjected to “a defect of consent”? “The group proposes a transformation of the subjects excluding autonomy”: what autonomy do the monks of a monastery possess? Are monasteries and convents “cults”? “It [the group] advocates ruptures of every kind. These procedures cut people off from their family and friendly circle”: during their retreat of three years, three months and three days, cut off from the world, do Buddhists, practising a religion “recognised” by the State, form part of a “cult”? “It [the group] instrumentalises individuals in the service of the group and of its leaders and shuts them into a costly dependence”: by way of an answer, let us cite MF Hirigoyen again, p.270: “Managerial discourse is an example of these half-truths and other arrangements with reality. It means to be seductive for the job candidate and for the good image of the company, but it is above all manipulative, seeking to put the employees under a hold so that they obey docilely”. Is that a behaviour characteristic of a dérive sectaire? “It [the group] exploits anxieties, fears and develops guilt”: is the MIVILUDES, exploiting the fear of “cults” in the public mind for 10 years, preceded by the MILS, itself a “cult” (note, in Culture Droit no. 18 of November 2008, Jean-Michel Roulet, former president of the MIVILUDES, comments on the mission’s action: “One must remain vigilant. Towards dérives sectaires, but also towards ourselves. We must not transform ourselves into a cult by setting ourselves up as directors of conscience”)? “It [the group] makes the prospect of leaving the group problematic”: is a CAC 40 company, with a significant rate of suicides due at least in part to managerial harassment, in a context of job scarcity making the prospect of leaving the group problematic, guilty of a dérive sectaire?

The ineptitude of MF Hirigoyen’s argumentation and her lack of sociological lucidity on the subject, which no longer astonish coming from the MIVILUDES and the anti-cult associations, are distressing on the part of so-called experts charged with “understanding the human”.

Why do the “cults” constitute the only chapter of the book dealing with groups of people whose case is said to be so particular that they must be treated separately? No other type of group is entitled to such a chapter. MF Hirigoyen adopts without discernment the message of governmental anti-cult policy, presenting the “cults” as a social scourge and implying that the techniques of hold in these groups are particularly harmful.

How does she justify the use of the notion of psychological subjection against the “cultic movements” (the About-Picard law reflected in all the ad hoc articles of the penal code), when this notion is absent from the offence of moral harassment in companies (in the reflection on which she largely participated) or from the offence of psychological violence within the couple? This question, essential in that it today conditions a justice moving away from the ordinary law for the “cults”, i.e. for more than 500,000 citizens according to the MIVILUDES, is not addressed by the author.

The American sociologist David Bromley, analysing the notion of “brainwashing” used for the “cults” (and at the origin of the French notion of mental manipulation), comments: “The way in which the terms “conversion” and “brainwashing” are used to designate processes of adherence is revealing. There are numerous institutional domains in the social order where a high level of control, an encapsulation and a transformation of identity appear, without any appeal being made to the notion of brainwashing. These regulatory frameworks are considered “adapted” to the social order and the evaluation of individuals’ participation is measured on a scale going from rehabilitation to honorific appreciations”.

This stepping-back on the question of the “cults” is absent from MF Hirigoyen’s book. Even in the concluding remarks of the book, which appear to us the most convincing on the state of the world (“The lie has become so banal that liars recognised as such continue to express themselves in the media, or keep their political mandate”), MF Hirigoyen cannot prevent herself from suggesting that the “cults” and other fundamentalist religions profit from the world’s unhappiness and the loss of meaning.

A hypertrophy of the victim-manipulator model

MF Hirigoyen is a victimologist and her reflection is founded on a model presenting on one side the victims of manipulation and on the other the manipulators, the solution to the problem being, in part, to help the victims better to spot the manipulators and their manipulations. The enemy is therefore outside; it must be circumscribed.

This model is in perfect harmony with the State’s victim policy (see the book by Caroline Eliacheff and Daniel Soulez-Larivière: “Le temps des victimes”). One can even imagine that power manages to promote and favour the experts who validate its action and its vision of the world.

MF Hirigoyen’s book begins thus: “Who can say that he has never been manipulated? Who has never had the feeling that someone had “taken advantage” of him, that he had been swindled?”. This introduction is a summary of the “reflection” that follows, leading naturally to the victim-manipulator model.

An alternative introduction could have been: “Who has realised that his demand for love and his fears had led him to let himself be manipulated? Who has never had the feeling that his demand for recognition had created a situation in which he had let himself be abused or swindled?”. This introduction would have opened new perspectives, since it makes responsible the individual who previously called himself a victim. Certainly, some people try to manipulate others, but in most cases, is it not also because the latter’s own demands (and manipulations) are unconscious that they leave the field free to the former?

MF Hirigoyen asserts on p.54: “The effectiveness of a manipulation depends less on the predisposition of the targeted person than on the skill of the manipulator”. She reiterates in the same vein on p.152: “As we have seen, it is the skill of the manipulator that counts, much more than the personality of the targeted person”, then again on p.213. What proof does the victimologist bring to assert that the success of a manipulation is more the doing of the manipulator’s skill than of the unconsciousness of the victim’s own expectations or fears? None. But this model makes it possible to point the finger at the manipulators, to consolidate the status of victim and the profession of victimologist, to go in the direction of the State’s victim policy, all while dispensing with any true reflection on the victims.

An alternative that seems to us fundamental is, on the contrary, to put forward “self-knowledge” as a defence against manipulation (undergone or carried out). If a person has a clear consciousness of her demand for love, for recognition, of her fears, of her expectations, it is probable that she will be less their plaything for herself and less the plaything of others. It is not a matter, as MF Hirigoyen proposes, of making a psychological profile of the victim, but rather of proposing a direct experience of one’s own drives and feelings. This alternative model of course gives a preponderant place to a “new education” which would put at the centre of its action, from childhood, self-knowledge, whereas the educational system today is reduced to instruction (see for example the alternative educational experiments, conducted notably within groups which, of course, are automatically qualified as “cults”). Education then becomes the antidote to manipulation, and not therapy after the fact. It is not said that every therapy aimed at victims or at manipulators is useless, but one can imagine that an educational system putting the development of the human person at the centre would considerably reduce the number of future manipulators and the number of victims of these manipulations.

This alternative reflection is absent from MF Hirigoyen’s work. At best she suggests, p.280, opening “our eyes so as not to fall into the traps set for us, let us educate our children and see to it that we denounce abusive doings as objectively as possible, taking care not to accuse in an arbitrary fashion this person or that group of persons”; spiritual, educational and therapeutic minorities, experimenting with alternative life choices and qualified as “cults”, included?

Our summary opinion

If one keeps to the question of the “cults”, MF Hirigoyen’s book belongs to the category “psychology for dummies”, just as there is “cooking for dummies” or “gardening for dummies”; but contrary to those two domains, which do not engage potential hasty judgements about people, the book in question issues untruths and falls within the fit of intellectual laziness overwhelming the French intelligentsia on the question of the “cults”. One may wonder about the pertinence of this type of work on so sensitive a subject. On the other hand, it is an ideal book for getting oneself invited onto television sets.